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Federal Court of Justice on ambiente.de

Historical decision archive on domain law. For the transfer to today's conflict, protective rights, domain extension and the rules at the time of the new procedure are decisive.

Unofficial translation of a historical decision. For quotations and the precise wording of the order, consult the original-language text.

Name rights and competing name holders

Historical decision

Ta t b e s t a d

Under the name "Ambiente" in Frankfurt am Main, the plaintiff is organizing a fair for table culture cuisine, living and lighting concepts and gift ideas. Since 1994 she has been the owner of the brand "Messe Frankfurt Ambiente", which is registered for the organisation and organisation of trade fairs and exhibitions.

The defendant is DENIC. It assigns the domain names (Internet addresses) that end with ".de". The ending ".de" is the so-called top-level domain indicating Germany; the immediately preceding component of a domain name is referred to as a second-level domain. The defendant registers a domain name, which can only be assigned once for technical reasons, for the applicant if it is not already registered for another; it does not check whether the registered designation has the rights of third parties.

When the plaintiff wanted to register the name "ambiente.de" for herself, she found that this had already been awarded by the defendant to a third party - the defendant's intervener. The plaintiff demanded from the intervener, referring to her rights to the designation 'Ambiente', the release of the domain name. He then pledged to refrain from any action that could lead to the term "ambiente.de" being used on the Internet, but refused to release the domain name. Subsequently, the plaintiff asked the defendant, submitting the declaration of injunction, to terminate the transfer of the domain name to the intervener and to enter the domain name for her. The defendant refused. She only entered the plaintiff in her so-called waiting list; the plaintiff then moves into the position of intervener if he releases the domain name "ambiente.de".

The plaintiff is of the opinion that, after the intervener’s declaration that he no longer wants to use “ambiente.de” on the Internet, the defendant is obliged to cancel the existing registration for him and now enter the domain name “ambiente.de” for her. As a dominant company, the defendant is obliged to pay close attention to its registration policy to all interested parties. According to these guidelines, the mere reservation of a domain name is no longer possible. The registration maintained by the intervener and the simultaneous declaration that the domain name was in fact never intended to be used was tantamount to a mere reservation. The defendant was therefore not only entitled but also obliged to terminate the contractual relationship with the intervener.

The applicant has requested:

to order the defendant to annul the registration of the intervener as Dornain holder of the string "Ambiente" under the TOP-Level-Domain ".de" and to accept the applicant's application for registration of a string "Ambiente" as a domain name under the TOP-Level-Domain ".de" under the conditions regulated in its award guidelines in the current version and to register her as a domain holder;

In the alternative:

to establish that the defendant is not entitled, on the basis of a registration already made for the intervener, to reject an application by the plaintiff for the registration of the sign "Ambiente" under the TOP-Level-Domain ".de".

The defendant and his interlocutor opposed it.

The Regional Court has granted the action with the main request (LG Frankfurt a.M.). WRP 1 999, 366). The appeals court dismissed the action (OLG Frankfurt a.M WRP 2000, 214 = WuW/E DE-R 442).

With the appeal, the plaintiff is pursuing her complaints. The defendant and his intervener request that the appeal be rejected.

E n t s c h e i u n g s g r ü n d e

I. The Court of Appeal has denied a claim of the plaintiff to rewrite the name in question. As justification, it stated:

When assessing the license plate and competition law admissibility of a particular second-level domain, the principles of press liability in competition law should be applied accordingly. If an applicant infringes the mark rights of a third party by registration and unauthorized use of a particular designation or impedes it in a manner that is illegal under competition law, the defendant as awarding authority can be claimed only from two points of view: either the defendant wants to promote the intentionally committed infringement of the third party or it does not block an entry after an indication of its unlawfulness, although it is clear to them that it infringes the mark or competition law in a gross manner. An obvious violation of the law is to be assumed, for example, if a domain name is easily recognizable by the defendant with a famous mark and the applicant wants to attach himself to it in an inadmissible manner or block the domain name in an apparently unlawful manner.

In addition, claims under §§ 33, 20 para. 1 GWB to be considered. The defendant holds on the market for the allocation of second-level domains under the top-level domain ".de" a monopoly, at least it is a market-strong company. In the context of § 20 Abs. 1 of the GWB, however, it is also necessary to ensure that the defendant – similar to a press company – only has limited inspection obligations when taking advertisements. It is not reasonable for the defendant to carry out extensive legal reviews and to examine and assess in detail the legal relations between the applicant and a third party, in this case the applicant and the intervener. A claim against the domain assignment authority to delete and reassign a second-level domain therefore only comes into consideration if the pre-existing registration is obviously unlawful and the owner of the domain name clearly behaves unlawfully.

On the basis of these standards, the defendant was not obliged to comply with the applicant’s request. It is irrelevant whether the statement of submission made by the intervener led to a corresponding contract or whether only legal claims of the applicant vis-à-vis the intervener could be considered. Even if such a contract had been concluded, the defendant was not to be expected to review and finally assess the disputed contractual relationships between the parties. Furthermore, the applicant had, by her own conduct, suggested that her legal relationship with the intervener had not yet been finally clarified, since she did not consider his declaration of injunction to be sufficient and considered that further measures were necessary. If the intervener’s declaration of submission did not lead to an injunction, a claim against the defendant could also not be substantiated. The term "ambience" appears in numerous other versions, company names and keywords, so that from the point of view of the defendant a trademark claim against the intervener from the name protected for the plaintiff "Messe Frankfurt Ambiente" was not obvious.

The examination of the admissibility of a certain second-level domain is then initially solely the responsibility of the applicant. The main task of the domain assignment agency is to manage the domain system cost-effectively, quickly and reliably and in particular to allocate new second-level domains. Its task, however, is not to comprehensively examine the mutually opposing designations in the event of conflict with regard to all basis of claim. Only if it is presented with a final and enforceable judgment against the first respondent, in this case the intervener, prohibiting the latter from registering or using the domain name in question and obliging him to release it, can the defendant be required to rescind the previous registration and proceed in accordance with the order of the waiting list.

The attacks of the revision directed against this assessment are not successful. The Court of Appeal has rightly assumed that the plaintiff is not entitled to deletion and reassignment of the domain name "ambiente.de" vis-à-vis the defendant.

The Court of Appeal has correctly assumed that the plaintiff is not entitled to any trademark or competition claims against the defendant.

In the examination of trademark and competition law claims, the Court of Appeal has rightly considered only the liability of the defendants for their involvement in an infringement by the intervener. The dispute does not provide any evidence that the defendant himself could have directly infringed mark rights or violated competition law. The registration and administration of a domain name by the defendant for a third party - comparable to the registration of a trademark by the German Patent and Trademark Office - is not to be regarded as a use in business transactions within the meaning of §§ 14,15 MarkenG. As far as the appeal brings this into question, it only focuses on the actions of the intervener: By registering "ambiente.de" as a domain name, he has already infringed the plaintiff's trademark rights. Whether this is true can remain open in the event of a dispute (cf. ÖOGH MarkenR 2001, 253, 254 - cyta.at), because an immediate infringement by the defendant is not in question. It is also not apparent that the defendant with the registration and administration of the domain name "ambiente.de" pursued the intention to promote own or third-party competition to the detriment of the plaintiff and thus to act for the purposes of the competition in accordance with § 1 UWG.

An indirect infringement of mark rights by the defendant, which the appeals court considered possible in principle, is also not considered in the case of dispute. The Trademark Act, which is referred to in § 14 Abs. 4 treats certain preparatory acts as trademark infringement (cf. Starck, Festschrift Piper, p.) 827 if.), does not regulate the indirect trademark infringements conclusively (cf. OLG Düsseldorf WRP 1996, 559, 562-adp; lngerl v Rohnke1MarkenG, § 14 paragraphs. 136. However, insofar as an indirect infringement of mark rights is also possible, it is a form of participation which presupposes intentional behaviour on the part of the third party. This is lacking in disputes.

The Court of Appeal has examined in detail whether the defendant is liable as a disturber because - through no fault of her own - she has set up an attributable cause for a violation of the rights of the plaintiff by the intervener with the registration of the domain name. This question was rightly denied by the Court of Appeal in the end.

The Court of Appeal has correctly assumed that interfering liability presupposes the violation of examination obligations. According to the settled case-law of the Senate, a disruptor may in principle be claimed for omission and remedy who has willfully and adequately contributed causally to the bringing about or maintenance of an unlawful impairment even without any intention to promote competition and without fault. In doing so, the support or exploitation of the action of a third party acting independently may also suffice as cooperation, provided that the claimed party had the legal possibility to prevent this action. However, because the liability of the disturber may not be extended unduly to third parties who have not themselves carried out the unlawful impairment, the liability of the disturber presupposes the violation of examination obligations. The extent of this is determined by whether and to what extent the person claimed as a disturber is to be expected a test according to the circumstances (cf. BGH Urt. v. 10.10.1996 1 ZR 129/94, GRUR 1997, 313, 315 f. = WRP 1997, 325 -architect competition, on the UWG; judgment v. 30.6.1994 -1 ZR 40/92 GRUR 1994, 841,-842 f. = WRP 1994, 739 - Search word, on the right of sign; judgment v. 15.10.1998 -I ZR 120/96, GRUR 1999, 418, 419 f. = WRP 1999, 211 - furniture classics, on copyright, m.w.N.

The Court of Appeal has further rightly assumed that the defendant is in principle only to be expected to be examined for obvious, from their point of view clear violations of the law. The defendant is regularly only obliged to refuse or cancel the registration of a domain name if it is not difficult for him to recognize that the use of this domain name affects the rights of third parties (cf. ÖOGH, Medien und Recht 2001, 328, 331 1 - fpo.at; LG Frankfurt a.M. CR 2001, 51; LG Magdeburg K&R 1999, 426, 428 = MMR 1999, 607; Abel, CR 1999, 788 f.; Hoeren, WuB V F § 14 MarkenG 2.00; Welzel, MMR 2000, 38 f.: Bettinger/Freytag, CR 1999, 28, 33 ff.; Wagner, ZHR 162 [1998], 701, 719 ff.; Bücking, Internet Name and Mark Law, 1999, paragraphs. 252; doubtful: Völker/Weidert, WRP 1997, 852, 661 f.; for a further examination obligation: Völker, WuB V F § 14 MarkenG 1.00, para. 3; against an obligation to examine: A. Nordemann, NJW 1997, 1891.1896 f.; Poeck in Schwarz (ed.), Recht im Internet, Abschn. 4-2.1, p. 16). Furthermore, these limited inspection obligations do not concern the - automated - initial registration of a domain name, but only intervene if the defendant is informed that the registered domain name violates the rights of third parties.

aa) The Senate has assessed the extent to which the audit obligations of a potential disruptor extend, taking into account the function and task of the person claimed as a disruptor as well as with regard to the personal responsibility of the directly acting third party (cf. BGH, Urt. v. 3.11.1994 -1 ZR 122/92, GRUR 1995, 62.64 f. - Concrete conservation; judgment v. 18.2.1993 -1 ZR 14/91, GRLJR 1093, 561, 562 WRP 1903, 476; tYrt. 30.6.1994 - 1 ZR 167/92, GRUR 1994, 819, 821 WRP 1994, 728; judgment v. 18.10.1995 - 1ZR227/93, GRUR 1998, 71, 72f. WRP 1996, 98- Product Information I to IIl; GRUR 1997, 313, 315 f. -Architectural Competition. In order not to make the work of the persons concerned unduly difficult and not to overwhelm those responsible, for example, only a limited obligation to examine was assumed if the state of disruption is not readily recognizable or only with disproportionate effort for the person claimed as a disruptor (cf. BGH, Urt. v. 26.4.1990 .- 1 ZR 127/88, GRUR 1990, 1012, 1014 WRP 1991, 19; judgment v. 7.5.1999 - I ZR 119/90 GRUR 1992, 618, 619 = WRP 1992, 640 - Press Liability I and II; GRUR 1994, 841, 842f. Searchword; Urt. v. 10.4.1997 - 1 ZR 3/95, GRUR 1997, 909, 911 = WRP 1997, 1059 - business book nomenclature.

bb For the phase of the original registration, the defendant is not to be expected to have any examination obligations under these principles, taking into account their function and task as well as with regard to the personal responsibility of the applicant. Nor does the appeal take the view that the defendant would have been obliged to refuse the first registration of "ambiente.de" by the intervener.

The task of the defendants is to assign and manage the second-level domains below the German top-level domain ".de". The defendant, who is not pursuing his own purposes and is not acting for profit, performs this task in the interest of all Internet users. The fulfilment of this task is also in the public interest. If it were not taken over by a private organization such as the defendant, it would have to be fulfilled - as in some cases abroad - by state authorities, just as state authorities in the general interest also grant street names and house numbers or register trademarks (Bettinger/Freytag, CR 1999, 28, 35). In Germany, there is currently no reason to transfer the registration of domain names into a different legal and organizational framework (cf. Hoeren, OR 1996, 355, 356; Wagner aaO S). 704 f.; Stromr, Online-Recht, 1997, p. 52. According to the Federal Government, the defendant has so far worked to the satisfaction of the German Internet community; her registration procedure ensures a functional and fair supply of domain names (BT printing) for all applicants. 14/3956 v. 28.7.2000, p. 4).

The defendant, who employs only a few employees, tries to make the registration procedure effective and to ensure the fastest possible and inexpensive registration by assigning the registered domain names in an automated procedure solely on the principle of priority, without checking whether the registered designation has the rights of third parties (on the technical and organizational framework conditions of the domain assignment cf. Bettinger/Freytag, OR 1999, 28, 29 f.; for domain allocation abroad cf. Stromer, online law, 2. ed. 1998, p. 79 et seq. Only in this way has the defendant been able to cope with the registration of a large number of second-level domains. Any examination, even if it is limited to completely clear infringements that are visible to everyone, would not be compatible with the proven automated limitation period.

cc) But even if the defendant is informed by a third party of an alleged infringement of his rights, they have only limited examination obligations. In this second phase, the defendant is required to delete a registration only if the infringement of the rights of third parties is manifest and readily detectable by the defendant. For this second phase, too, it is true that further-reaching examination obligations would overwhelm the defendants and make their work unreasonably difficult (cf. Kur, Internet und Kennzeichenrecht, in: Loewenheim/Koch, Praxis des Online-Rechts, 1998, p. 325, 373; Bettinger/Freytag, CR 1999, 28, 35 f.

The examination of the legal admissibility of a particular domain name - as the Court of Appeal has rightly assumed - is in principle initially solely the responsibility of the applicant. Since he selects the string to be registered as a domain name and the domain name is used for his purposes, it is his responsibility to ensure that the registered domain name does not infringe any rights of third parties. Accordingly, the applicant has to comply with the registration conditions of the defendants, which are also based on the Internet standard RFC 1591, which is recognized worldwide by the national registration authorities (cf. Bettinger/Freytag, CR 1999, 28,29), when registering the domain name, to assure that he has checked the designation for compatibility with the rights of third parties and that there have been no indications of infringement of the rights of third parties. The defendant could no longer perform his task in the usual efficient manner if he were obliged to enter into a legal examination in each case where a third party asserts rights in a registered domain name. Even if it is presented with a breach of third-party rights, as a purely technical registration body, it is regularly in a position to assess whether the alleged breach has occurred. If the defendant were obliged to investigate all alleged infringements, the obligation to examine would no longer be limited to exceptional cases. Their personnel and material resources would not be sufficient for such an examination in view of the large number of registration applications to be processed and the numerous conflict cases. The settlement of the conflict could by no means be definitively left to the defendant; decisive would also be the judicial settlement of the dispute between the two pretenders, i.e. between the owner of the domain name and the third party claiming better rights. Moreover, it does not seem appropriate to shift the liability and legal risk of a domain name's owner in disputes to the defendant. In these circumstances, the defendant cannot be prevented from referring third parties who claim to have their rights infringed by a domain name to assert possible claims against the owner of the domain name.

The situation is different only if the defendant can establish without any doubt that a registered domain name violates the rights of third parties without further investigation. In the case of such obvious violations, which are easily recognizable by the competent official of the defendant, the defendant can be expected to revoke the registration.

As the Court of Appeal has correctly assumed, the defendant can only easily recognize the infringement of mark rights - alleged by the appeal in the event of a dispute - if he has a legally binding judicial title or if the infringement is so clear that it must impose itself on him (cf. Abel, CR 1999, 788 f.; Welzel, MMR 2000, 39, 40; Renck, NJW 1999, 3587, 3593; Kur aaO S. 373; Köhler in Köhler/Piper, UWG, 2. ed., § 1 para. 329). These conditions are not met in the event of a dispute.

(aa) The defendant cannot normally judge whether the use of a domain name creates a risk of confusion and thus contravenes § 14 para. 2 No 2 MarkenG violates. The question of the risk of confusion under trademark law must be answered taking into account all the circumstances of the individual case, which include in particular the three mutually interrelated assessment elements - the character of the sign older in priority, the identity or similarity of the signs as well as the identity or similarity of the goods or services marked therewith (cf. BGH, Urt. v. 16.11.2000 - 1 ZR 34/98, GRUR 2001, 507, 508 WRP 2001, 694 - EVIAN/ REVIAN, m.w.N. Even if the defendant could - as the revision suggests - inform himself in databases without great effort about currently awarded marks and also find out for which goods or services the domain name is used, it would not be possible for her to answer the often difficult legal question of whether there is a risk of confusion after the necessary consideration of all circumstances. No less difficult is it in general for the defendant to reliably assess whether a trademark is a known marking and whether the use of the domain name unfairly exploits or impairs its distinctiveness or appreciation without justifiable reason (§ 14 para.). 2 Nr.3 MarkenG; see BGH, Urt. v. 1.3.2001 - I ZR 211/98, Umdr. S. 14 ff. - Tagesschau. This assessment also requires special knowledge of trademark law, which cannot be assumed for the defendants’ case handlers. As the Court of Appeal has rightly assumed, a trademark infringement can be obvious to the defendant if the domain name is identical to a famous trademark that has outstanding validity even in general circles (cf. Wagner aaO S. 721; moreover, Völker aaO Rdn. 4; Ubber, WRP 1997, 497, 511). Furthermore, in order to be able to speak of an obviousness, these circumstances must also be readily accessible to the defendants' employees.

bb The Court of Appeal has rightly assumed that the defendant is not liable as an interferer in the context of possible trademark infringement on the basis of these standards. Contrary to the opinion of the final complaint, the defendant could not recognize within the framework of the reasonable examination that the use of the domain name "ambiente.de" by the intervener infringes the unregistered known trademark claimed by the plaintiff, "Ambiente" (§ 4 no. 1). 2, § 14 Abs. 2 No 3 MarkenG.

(1) A legally binding judicial title from which it results that the use of the domain name "ambiente.de" infringes trademark rights of the plaintiff does not exist. A violation of § 14 Abs. 2 No 3 MarkenG is also not exceptionally obvious because the component of the domain name "ambiente" would match a famous trademark "ambiente" of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has argued that the 'ambience' brand for the services it offers is not only well-known to professionals but also to the general public. However, it cannot be concluded from this that this circumstance is also readily obvious to the defendants' assistants.

(2) Whether claims under trademark or competition law exist was also not readily apparent to the defendant because - as the replies to the final complaint of the defendant and the intervener rightly assert - it has not been established (and also not stated) that the intervener uses the domain name "ambiente.de" in business transactions. According to the findings of the Court of Appeal, the intervener only uses the domain name in such a way that he has posted photographs of various cities and landscapes on the corresponding homepage.

(3) Finally, there is also no indication that the intervener unfairly exploits or impairs the appreciation of the - assuming - well-known trademark "Ambiente" without a justifiable reason by using the domain name "ambiente.de". Even if the intervener, such as the appeal, asserts that the use of the domain name identical to the claimant's mark would have benefited the applicant's concepts of quality and thus attracted additional guests to his homepage, this could not be readily assumed to be unfair.

(4) A legally binding title, by which the owner of the domain name has been condemned to omit this designation, is not necessary, of course, if the owner of the domain name has brought the third party by a declaration of submission without action. For the defendant, however, such a declaration can only be relevant if there is no serious dispute between the third party and the owner of the domain name about the validity of the corresponding injunction contract. This prerequisite is also not given in the present case. It was not readily possible for the defendant to judge for himself whether such a contract had been concluded. Even if, as the appeal suggests, the defendant were to be expected to legally assess the correspondence between the plaintiff and the intervener known to her, she could not clearly infer the conclusion of a corresponding contract of injunction. Even in this exchange of correspondence, the applicant described the intervener’s declaration of submission as insufficient. In these circumstances, she cannot expect the defendant to unequivocally affirm a claim of the applicant against the intervener to release the domain name.

The Court of Appeal has rightly assumed that the plaintiff does not have any antitrust claims under Sections 33, 20 para. 1 GWB.

The defendant has a preeminent position in the German market for the award of second-level domains because of the importance of the top-level domain "de" awarded by her alone. However, the refusal to withdraw the domain name "ambiente.de" from the intervener and to register it for the plaintiff does not constitute an unreasonable obstacle. Rather, the required weighing of interests (in this regard BGH, Urt. v.) falls. 27.4.1999 - KZR 35/97, GRLIR 2000, 95, 96 = WRP 1999, 1175 - Firefighting equipment, m.w.N.) in favour of the defendants. It can remain open to the extent to which the plaintiff has better rights to the domain name "ambiente.de". In any case, the defendants’ interest in an effective procurement practice should in principle be assessed higher. In this respect, the same principles apply which are also relevant for the assessment of interference liability. Only if it is obvious and clear to the defendant that the use of the domain name affects the rights of the third party does their interest take precedence over that of the third party with the result that the defendant has to cancel the registration of the first applicant.

Contrary to the view of the final complaint, the unreasonableness does not arise from the fact that the defendant would be entitled to terminate the intervener without notice because his conduct constitutes a reservation of the domain name "ambiente.de" which is inadmissible under the registration conditions. Whether such a right of termination would exist if the intervener - as announced in his criminally protected submission declaration to the plaintiff - would not use the domain name, can remain open, because the intervener operates according to the unobjectioned findings of the appeal court at ambiente.de a homepage.

Practical examples

An association finds its name as a foreign domain. Statutes and first use prove his position.

Two family businesses have the same name. An addition to the industry can reduce confusion.

An address gives the impression of a city portal. Design and ending are included in the assignment check.

A trustee registers in advance for a name bearer. Order and recognizability are reconstructed in time.